Revisiting the New Property After Twenty-Five Years by Verkuil, Paul R.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 10
Revisiting the New Property After Twenty-Five
Years
Paul R. Verkuil
Copyright c 1990 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Paul R. Verkuil, Revisiting the New Property After Twenty-Five Years, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 365
(1990), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/10
REVISITING THE NEW PROPERTY AFTER TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS
PAUL R. VERKUIL*
Undoubtedly, The New Property1 was one of the pathbreaking
articles in American law when it appeared twenty-five years ago.
Charles Reich rethought the existing legal categories and produced
a new synthesis. As one who first read that article in law school, I
remain fascinated by its willingness to reexamine the relationship
between law and social values in contrast to much of the legal
scholarship produced at that time.2 The concept of the new prop-
erty has become commonplace in our jurisprudence; it has been the
primary technique for converting the due process clause into a tool
of civil justice.
But twenty-five years is a fair test of any proposition, and
enough has changed in the law and in society over that time to
justify its reexamination today. That is why this symposium is so
appropriate. It offers us an opportunity to rethink established as-
sumptions and some neglected questions. After listening to and
reading Charles Reich's paper, it is safe to say that one thing has
not changed: Professor Reich remains an unreconstructed
Reichian. Thus the task is left to others to point out the cracks in
the foundation of the new property.
I. THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE DILEMMA
Perhaps the best place to start is with Reich's airline flight anal-
ogy. 3 One is either on the airplane or not; if on the flight, one's
freedom will be restricted by seatbelts and tyrannical flight attend-
ants. Reich makes this sound like an unreasonable intrusion upon
* President and Professor of Law and Government, College of William and Mary.
1. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
2. The other article in The New Property issue of the Yale Law Journal demonstrates
the contrast. See Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collat-
eral, 73 YALE L.J. 788 (1964).
3. See Reich, The Liberty Impact of The New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295,
296-97 (1990).
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personal freedom. But the "sacrifices" one makes on that airplane
are endured for the benefits of travel received. Reich focuses on
the rights of insiders and thereby ignores a whole category of out-
siders-those left out of the airplane altogether; not just those who
missed the flight, but those with no hope of such travel. There is
an almost blithe assumption that all are eligible for the same treat-
ment, and therefore the treatment is the issue rather than access
to it.
But the interests of the excluded also demand consideration. To
calculate the social utility of any public activity requires a broader
inquiry. My major criticism of the Reichian approach is that it
lacks an awareness of the need to make choices, and of the absence
of choice for many. Reich refers to the game of musical chairs and
implies that society views those who cannot secure a chair as some-
how inadequate.4 But he offers no analysis of this apt analogy. Life
is all about rationing and scarcity. We are all living without enough
chairs, which is why tradeoffs are necessary. Reich seems to sug-
gest the contrary: that one can solve the dilemma of musical chairs
by providing one more chair.
Unfortunately, rationing is an inevitable condition of life. It con-
trols whatever we do, even in the law. In the last twenty-five years
the growth of another profound movement in the law-that of eco-
nomic analysis 5 -has made this necessity to choose very clear. In a
sense, the law and economics movement is a reaction to The New
Property.' It seeks to balance questions of rights against equally
hard questions of the allocation of resources to fulfill those rights.
Economics also inquires about the intended and unintended effects
of policy.
The point is not that one must choose between Reich and Ep-
stein, 7 but that one cannot make sense of the law without consider-
ing both views. Reich completely ignores the impact of economic
analysis upon his views. In some ways, this unreconstructed liber-
alism is admirable in its proclamation of the importance of the in-
4. Id. at 301-02.
5. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d. ed. 1986).
6. For a contemporary reaction to the new property way of thinking, see Leff, Unconscio-
nability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
7. See Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 375
(1990).
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dividual. In other ways, it is frustrating because it ignores the im-
pact of individually focused decisions upon larger groups. The
airline analogy is again revealing in this regard. Reich laments that
"[i]ndividual liberty is threatened by economic control over people
and the resulting excessive dependency."" The idea that depen-
dency upon economic status is threatening must seem jejune to
those who do not enjoy it. Who would not trade the temporary
confinement of the airplane for the opportunity of worldwide
travel?
The airline analogy also applies to the "spaceship earth" itself.
The United States of America cannot satisfy the enormous immi-
grant demand for entry. Choices must be made about who can
enter and how entry should be determinedf These are both sub-
stantive and process decisions. The liberty values inherent in the
new property are not of very much help. An inherent tension exists
between those who have achieved a certain status, whether it be
evidenced by airline travel or entry into our country, and those
who have not. The new property concept is largely unhelpful in
making determinations about who should get in.10 It avoids the is-
sue of entry and legitimacy by confining itself to serving those eli-
gible for benefits. It involves due process for those already "on
board." In Reich's context, of course, being on board also refers to
those already in the country or those in businesses or professions
as opposed to those for whom such opportunities are not available.
II. THE GOLDBERG COMPLICATION
The best way to elucidate the problem of those on the outside is
through the very due process cases that owe so much to Reich's
profound ideas. In Goldberg v. Kelly," the majority opinion virtu-
ally adopted The New Property for its analytical framework. In so
doing, however, it also exposed the weaknesses of that concept.
Goldberg is an ideal laboratory for measuring the social utility of
8. Reich, supra note 3, at 296.
9. See, e.g., Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984).
10. Under immigration law, no due process protection is afforded to those who have not
"entered" the United States. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1952). As far as I am aware, the new property concept does not contradict this doctrine.
11. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Reich's due process contribution. Goldberg involved the question
of whether it was constitutional to terminate welfare benefits of
those who already had them-those on the inside if you
will-without a full-blown adversarial trial." In the New York wel-
fare system, the party facing benefits termination did not get all of
the attributes of a full trial, such as the right to contest evidence,
the right to cross examination and various other judicial trial at-
tributes. 3 The Supreme Court majority, referring to The New
Property and other articles of Charles Reich,'4 constitutionalized a
judicial-like procedure for deciding welfare cases. Those who al-
ready had welfare could not be denied it without the equivalent of
an administrative trial. 5
Justice Brennan's rhetoric for the majority is very powerful, but
Justice Black's dissent bears up exceedingly well.' 6 Because
Charles Reich was a law clerk to Justice Black, he must be familiar
with the Justice's arguments. Justice Black saw Justice Brennan's
approach as exemplifying the Constitution run rampant.'" What
Justice Brennan said is that although New York's legislature had
implemented a certain process for putting people on the welfare
system and taking them off, under the Constitution New York
could not do it that way. The Court saw its role as giving the legis-
lature explicit constitutional directions under the due process
clause.' 8 Justice Black argued that the due process clause did not
require such explicit controls and that the Court's action repre-
sented judicial legislation of the worst kind.'9 In so doing, the
Court jeopardized the social welfare experiment itself, which the
Court could in no way compel the states to provide. Justice Black
spoke in terms of "gratuities," which makes one doubt whether he
really bought the idea of public welfare at all.20 But non-accept-
ance of the underlying substantive values behind the welfare state
12. Id. at 255.
13. Id. at 259.
14. Id. at 262 n.8, 265 n.13.
15. Id. at 269.
16. Id. at 271 (Black, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 276-77 (Black, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 274-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 274, 276-77 (Black, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting).
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did not disqualify Justice Black from questioning the necessity of
constitutionalizing the administrative process that surrounds these
individual awards.2' In retrospect, Justice Black had a very strong
point.22
In effect, the Court in Goldberg chose to favor, under the Consti-
tution, those already receiving benefits as against those outside the
system.23 In its welfare program, New York utilized what
amounted to a self-certification process. Applicants stated that
they needed welfare benefits, had so many children, had so much
income, and signed a form to get on the rolls.24 The purpose was to
make it easy to get benefits in order to provide immediate aid to
those who needed it. But under that kind of a program who else
got on the rolls? Obviously, people fabricated their income levels
or number of children. The advantage of the system in New York
was that it could as quickly remove people who did not qualify as
it could enroll those who were deserving. The Goldberg due process
requirements ensured that once a person got on the system, it was
hard for them to be removed.
After Goldberg, the New York welfare program did what seemed
to be the sensible thing. It made entering the program more pro-
tracted. By requiring a hearing before benefits commenced, those
who were really deserving had to wait much longer to receive aid.25
What the Court accomplished was to force the state to favor the
interests of those who were on the rolls and who may not be de-
serving over the interests of those who had a legitimate need to get
on. Thus, Goldberg was more complicated than it appeared. It in
effect favored insiders over outsiders, a dimension that Reich ig-
nored then and now.
III. DESIGNING A SENSIBLE DUE PROCESS
The hard question remains how to define the role of the due pro-
cess clause in the mass justice situation. Given the need for new
21. Id. at 277-78 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. See generally J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL-
ITY CLAIMS (1983).
23. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
24. See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 479, 492-500 (1966).
25. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting)
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property, what is the best way to implement it procedurally? A
year after The New Property appeared, Reich addressed that issue
in a subsequent article.2 6 He talked about the need to implement
and protect new property through "full adjudicatory procedures,"2
which the Goldberg majority had accepted along with The New
Property itself. The use of trial type adjudication is troubling be-
cause it hamstrings the administrative system that is trying to do
the right thing.28 Very few challenges are made to the good faith of
those implementing the system; they are trying to administer it
with millions of claimants, and they are trying to administer to
each as correctly as they can.
This is a major social problem. It is not just concerned with wel-
fare benefits, which generate several million cases a year.29 The
problem also extends to a comparable number of social security
disability cases.30 These administrative decisions do not provide
the procedural ingredients that Goldberg mandated. Indeed, it
would have been a due process nightmare if Goldberg had been
fully vindicated. The system of public adjudication would have
ground to a halt. A full-blown hearing at the pre-termination stage
could have created a system in which the resources devoted to the
substantive benefits might have been expended in the process of
administration. That is the fallacy of Goldberg that Justice Black
foresaw in his dissent. It is also a flaw in the thinking of its aca-
demic architect, Charles Reich.
Ever since Goldberg, reformers and the courts have been looking
for procedural solutions that allow the administrative system to
function. Ironically, some of these procedural solutions are more
radical than Reich's in that they are not adjudicatory at all. Reich
wanted to create a new property, but he wanted to vindicate it by
26. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965).
27. Id. at 1253.
28. See Verkuil, The Search for a Legal Ethic: The Adversary System, Liberalism and
Beyond, 60 SOUNDINGS 54, 62-64 (1977).
29. For purposes of this argument, welfare benefits include Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicaid and food stamps.
The total number of recipients of welfare benefits exceeded 46 million people in 1987. Soc.
SEC. BULL.: ANN. STATISTICAL Supp. 2, 3, 336 (1988).
30. A total of 2.7 million Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits
were awarded in 1987. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 31:365
REVISITING THE NEW PROPERTY
using the adversarial procedures employed in the traditional prop-
erty context. The welfare benefits situation, however, is not really
an adversarial one. The government is rarely placed in the position
of the enemy.
The government is trying to do the right thing. We could have
voted, as Professor Smolla points out, 1 not to give benefits to any-
one. But if the public wants to give benefits, the political process
generates them. The question is how to administer the system with
the least intrusion and at the least cost, so that we can get the
maximum return on our investment in the public sector. The New
Property helped us greatly to understand the relevance of public
law to the formerly private world of benefits, but it did not aid us
in designing a functional administrative scheme. That work
continues.
Reich also questions the government's promotion of Youth Ser-
vice. Reich makes a fair criticism of Youth Service as another
method of making one dependent upon government benefits.
There is, he says, a "greater and greater tendency ... to use the
leverage of dependency upon work to govern an individual's pri-
vate life."' 32 As he suggests, tying college vouchers to Youth Service
has a coercive impact upon low income youths. But this flaw in the
program need not be fatal. Senator Nunn advocated connecting
youth service to access to college loans,33 but it was not the linch-
pin of the program. The Youth Service proposal can be adjusted to
account for that criticism. There is no need to throw out the baby
with the bathwater.
Youth Service should be voluntary in that participants can earn
vouchers, but others could not be penalized for not earning them.
Ideally, the service idea should be a way for traditional outsiders to
get inside. What Youth Service proposes is to create the very at-
mosphere that one might expect Reich to applaud: a sense of com-
munity and of public service. In Thomas Jefferson's words, Youth
Service might revive the concept of "civic virtue." That is a tall
order but not a futile one. Moreover, this sense of public duty has
31. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights in the Modern Administrative-Industrial State,
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321, 326 (1990).
32. Reich, supra note 3, at 302.
33. See S. 3, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 305 (1989).
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a Greening of America34 twist. Youth Service might be used to cre-
ate that sense of consciousness of community values for which
Reich has longed. Even though it is an example of government in-
tervention in people's lives, Youth Service ought to be given a
hearing on Reichian terms before it is rejected.
Reich's efforts to defend job security are a further manifestation
of the inside/outside problem. Job security for those who fear los-
ing their middle class status is indeed a poignant problem.3" But
the other side of the issue needs to be addressed as well. What
about those who aspire to the middle class status those jobs offer?
Unless Reich can add extra chairs to the game through economic
expansion, a subject he does not address, the fact remains that
those outside have claims equally compelling as those currently in-
side. Yet their stories are not told or considered.
Even our most rigid organization, the military, deserves more
credit than Reich gives it. It is true that the military has not yet
satisfactorily resolved the problem of homosexuality.36 But in some
respects the armed forces have opened their ranks to traditional
outsiders better than most other organizations, public or private.
Consider the success of minorities in reaching the highest ranks of
military service in comparison with the dearth of minorities in
leadership positions in the private sector. Reich's impressions of
the military are distorted. A balanced appraisal provides more
signs of progress than he concedes.
IV. SEARCHING FOR THE NEW PROCESS
Ultimately, my disagreement with Reich is not over his social
concerns, which are admirable, but with his tactics, which are un-
workable. Full adjudicatory procedures to implement the rights es-
tablished by the new property will project us into the kind of regu-
latory nightmare that Reich abhors. It does not have to be this
way.
There is room in the due process clause for procedural innova-
tion. We must confront the dilemma Goldberg poses: Too much
34. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
35. See Reich, supra note 3, at 301-02.
36. But even here, there are signs of progress. See Rethinking DOD Policy on Gays,
Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1989, at All, col. 1.
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proceduralization does not make things better; it makes things
worse. Process does not ensure anything. An old Yale colleague of
Reich's, Grant Gilmore, said it best:
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a
society. The values of a reasonably just society will reflect them-
selves in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the less
law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion
will lie down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society will
reflect themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society, the
more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law,
and due process will be meticulously observed.3 7
The real problem is how to achieve the reasonably just society Gil-
more envisions. The use of the due process clause is not the
answer.
If we can achieve public consensus on the values the new prop-
erty expresses, the adversarial nature of the decision process
should be minimized. Indeed, we have very little choice but to re-
think our social values, especially as lawyers and law students.
Even at our extravagant production levels, there are not enough
lawyers to staff a new property system that guarantees full adjudi-
catory procedures for everybody. What we need is a system that
considers alternatives, that tries to help people make the right de-
cisions, that watches out for them and checks them-but not
through trial type procedures and courts. These days the courts
are working at full speed just to handle disputes that involve tradi-
tional property cases, tort cases, constitutional law cases, and so
forth.
We need to take some of Reich's philosophy even further by
looking beyond full adjudicatory procedures. If we want to have a
new property that works, we need a new process to make it work.
That requires a shared sense of common purpose. Perhaps a dose
of The Greening of America is not a bad start. But that's the sub-
ject for another symposium.
37. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, 110-11 (1977) (paraphrasing Oliver Wendell
Holmes).
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